Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

2001

R.D. Andrus v. State of Utah, Department of
Highways, Salt Lake County, Gibbons & Reed Co. :
Petition for Rehearing
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
John S Boyden; John Paul Kennedy; George J Romney; Attorneys for Appellants.
Merlin R Lybbert; David W Slagel; B. L. Dart Jr; Raplh L Jerman; Attorneys for Appellees.
Recommended Citation
Legal Brief, R.D. Andrus v. State of Utah, Department of Highways, Salt Lake County, Gibbons & Reed Co., No. 13716.00 (Utah Supreme
Court, 2001).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/873

This Legal Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

RECEIVED
LAW LIBRARY

R. D. ANDRUS, et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,

DEC 9 19:»-

vs.
STATE OF UTAH and its DEPARTMENT
OF HIGHWAYS, SALT LAKE COUNTY, a
political subdivision of the State
of Utah, and GIBBONS & REED CO.,
a Utah corporation,

BRi&IAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY
J. Reuben Clark Law School

Defendants-Appellees.
ROBERT J. CAMERON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.

C a s e No.

J. P. GIBBONS, d/b/a GIBBONS &
REED CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, the
STATE OF UTAH, a sovereign, and
the COUNTY OF SALT LAKE,

13716

Defendants-Appellees.
RICHARD GROTEPAS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
J. P. GIBBONS, d/b/a GIBBONS &
REED CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, and the
STATE OF UTAH, a sovereign,
Defendants-Appellees.

FILED
OCT 2 11975
Clwfc Supremo Court, Utah

PLAINTIFF-APPELLANTS' PETITION FOR REHEARING
AND SUPPORTING BRIEF

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Continued from front cover
John S. Boyden
John Paul Kennedy
George J. Romney
Attorneys for PlaintiffsAppellants
10 East South Temple
Suite 1000 Kennecott Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
Telephones (801) 521-0800
Merlin R. Lybbert
David W. Slagel
Attorneys for DefendantsAppellees State of Utah
and County of Salt Lake
Continental Bank Building
Seventh Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 521-9000
B. L. Dart, Jr.
Ralph L. Jerman
Attorneys for DefendantsAppellees Gibbons & Reed Co.
430 Ten Broadway Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 521-6383
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

R. D. ANDRUS, et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
vs.

)
)
)

STATE OF UTAH and its DEPARTMENT
OF HIGHWAYS, SALT LAKE COUNTY, a
political subdivision of the State
of Utah, and GIBBONS & REED CO.,
a Utah corporation,
Defendants-Appellees.
ROBERT J. CAMERON,
• Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
J. P. GIBBONS, dba GIBBONS & REED
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, the STATE
OF UTAH, a sovereign, and the
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE,
Defendants-Appellees.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

PETITION FOR
REHEARING
Civil No.

)
)
)
)
)

RICHARD GROTEPAS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
J. P. GIBBONS, dba GIBBONS & REED
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, and the
STATE OF UTAH, a sovereign,
Defendants-Appellees.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

13716

TO THE HONORABLE C1IIKI .H'UTiri

'

OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OK

• '"."•"

-n.T-KP

; • ••

. .

is Petit ^ r * -- : Rehearing

of the above case, iru: \:i suppoii \ hei * o* , respect i^*.
1.
Court ™

. iow:

nid' t ho appeal in the case was argued befort t-us
Maw - -j ( | <i n, i(

2

-n September

-• ,

• :. *his r o u r t rendered its decisi on

i

:•

j & Reed Construct:] on

Company, Defendants and Respondents, -ii firming the act: ion 01 ihe
D

"

• 'i

^ r f -v->i, , —jrinr^^T'H

^'

- r\ ' <v r ^r t :v

D e f e*:da . ; r -

Respondent, ha,:
contrary V

the special verdicts o: t -i-

u y,

Judgmerr

against

• .t.i+r va-- ^Iso affir'-e^.

t
. • 3.

The P:dintif ib-M^K-J j.i it .- t

SUant to Ri'\r-

?r ..

• • " •: K a rehear i IIIM pi,u

• the fo! lr.wir i errands:

1

..

•

a p p e l l a n t s was riot

r o s o l v w i l;v t-n- -"oirt

on I v mi in I lii

' :,

I

I

• •

Oi

u n d e r s t o o d a:.-:

. ijsut:,

I

II

IS t 'i I

I "i \"

^nd was d i s c u s s e d

. — *• : -w
iA.: >,:

resolved.
.«.•*•

Jui , were evei looked, .iiis&tdU*a

i d e c i d e d bv the
.<, •. : c o n s t r u e d

^....ae../

affec* : ^ ' * :ie result -^ * he ns*^correct p r i e , , ^
c o r r e c t p r i n c i p l e - o-

:. ,

!-iw wor(« improperly a p p l i e c ,

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-iearly

affecting the result in this case.
For the foregoing reasons, it is urged that this Petition be
granted.
DATED this 20th day of October, 1975.
Respectfully submitted,
BOYDEN, KENNEDY, ROMNEY & HOWARD

I hereby certify that the foregoing Petition is submitted
in good faith and not for purposes of delay.
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THIS BRIEF, is submitted under Rule 76(e) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure and in this typewritten form, pursuant
to leave granted by this Court on October 16, 1975.
NATURE OF THIS CASE
This matter involves three consolidated actions for
damages against the State of Utah, Salt Lake County, and
Gibbons & Reed Construction Company, based on flooding damage
which occurred in two storms, during a state highway construction
project.

By order of the Court [R.59], and pursuant to Rule

42(b), the issue of liability was tried separately, reserving
for later proceedings, the question of damages.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT AND IN THE SUPREME COURT ON APPEAL
The Trial Court entered judgment against the State of Utah
and in favor of Plaintiffs.
Supreme Court.

This judgment was affirmed by the

Defendants do not seek a rehearing on this part

of the judgment.

However, the extent of the State's liability

is involved in a constitutional inverse condemnation question.
The Inverse Condemnation Count IV of Plaintiffs1 complaint,
was dismissed before trial [R.27].

For the purpose of fully

protecting their rights on appeal, Plaintiffs appealed from
the order of dismissal.

This Court granted a motion of Defen-

dants-Respondents to dismiss the appeal.
Provided, however, that this shall not
prejudice the right of the PlaintiffAppellant, to challenge the ruling
herein appealed from if a later appeal
is filed from subsequent final rulings
in this case. [R.47]
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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On subsequent appeal, the Plaintiffs urged that their
property had been taken and damaged in violation of the
Utah and Federal Constitutions [App.Br. 37]. The majority
of this Court did not discuss or render an opinion on
Plaintiffs Point III (Inverse Condemnation).

The dissenting

opinion delt solely with this issue.
On the question of effective denial of Plaintiffs' right
to a jury trial, as provided by the Constitution and laws of
this state, the disposition of the case was as follows:
A special verdict was returned by the Jury upon Interrogatories
submitted to it. Matters pertinent to Plaintiffs-Appellants
Petition for Rehearing, were found by the Jury upon special
Interrogatories submitted to it. The Jury found that Salt
Lake County unreasonably created a defective or dangerous condition
in the utilization of its storm drain system and that all Plaintiffs, except Richard Grotepas who had not sued the County,
were damaged as a proximate result.

[R.723-24]

In addition,

the Jury found that Salt Lake County was negligent in failing
to provide reasonably adequate drainage facilities for the
highway project and that Plaintiffs suffered damage as a proximate
result thereof.

[R.728]

Finally, the Jury found that Gibbons

& Reed Construction Company was negligent in failing to take
reasonable precautions to protect the project during construction
and that this negligence proximately caused damage to Plaintiffs.
[R.728]

An amended Order and Judgment was entered on May 15,

1974, under which the Court ruled that the County of Salt Lake
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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and the Gibbons & Reed Construction Company were not liable
for any damages suffered by the Plaintiffs.

The judgment of

the District Court was affirmed by the Supreme Court.
NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT
The Plaintiffs-Appellants now seek a rehearing on the
question of Inverse Condemnation, and on matters pertaining
to the effective denial of a jury trial regarding liability
of Salt Lake County and Gibbons & Reed Construction Company.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Plaintiffs in this action are all homeowners residing
in an area immediately west of Wasatch Boulevard near 4500
South in Salt Lake County [Ex.6(p)].

This general area is

located on the base slopes of Mount Olympus, which rises
sharply from the valley floor as part of the Wasatch front.
[Ex.l(p)]

The Defendant, Gibbons & Reed Construction Company,

was a contractor with the State of Utah, for construction of
the highway project in question.

[R.1775-1777, Ex.6(p)]

The facts concerning the flood and its damage to Plaintiffs,
are adequately set out in the majority opinion of this Court
and in Plaintiffs-Appellants Brief on Appeal.

The disposition

of this case in the Trial Court and in the Supreme Court on
Appeal, also constitute the facts forming a basis for the present
Petition for Rehearing.

Since these facts are specified under

a previous heading, it can serve no useful purpose to reiterate
them at this point.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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ARGUMENT
A.

Inverse Condemnation
Article I, Section 22, of the Constitution of Utah,

provides:
Private property shall not be taken
or damaged for public use without just
compensation.
Amendment V, of the Constitution of the United States
of America, provides:
• . .; nor shall private property
be taken for public use, without
just compensation.
The Federal Constitution does not refer to damage but since the
taking of "private property" includes personal propertyd' the
effect of the two constitutional provisions is identical for
the purposes of the case at bar as to the personal property
taken. (2)

Plaintiffs further contend that there was a taking

of real property for a period of time sufficient to bring the

(1)

Monongahela Nav. Co. v. U.S. 148 U.S. 312, 37 L.Ed. 345
(1893)
Armstrong v. U.S. 364 U.S. 40, 4 L.Ed. 2d 1554 (1960)
Causby v. U.S. 75 F.Supp. 262, 109 Ct.Cl. 768 (1948)
(Compensation for personal property destroyed by flooding)
Patrick v. Riley 209 Cal. 350, 287 P.455 (1930)
State v. Leeson 323 P.2d 692, 697 (1958)
Anderson Cattle Co. v. Kansas Turnpike Authority 308 P.2d
172, 176, 180 Kan. 749 (1957). See also, Van Alstyne,
Statutory Modification of Inverse Condemnation: The Scope
of Legislative Power 19 Stan.L.R. 727 at 739 Note 50.

(2)

The position of plaintiffs on this issue is to be distinguished from State Road Commission v. Brown 531 P.2d 1294
(Utah) (1975). The Utah Eminent domain statute refers to
real property but neither the State nor the Federal Constitution make such a distinction.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

case within the protection of the Federal Constitution, but
that question does not arise under the State Constitution, which
explicitly covers damage.
The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution was
originally a limitation only upon the powers of the Federal
Government.(3)

But, with the adoption of the Fourteenth Amend-

ment, its provision for just compensation for private property
taken for public use became fully operative as a restriction
upon the powers of the several states and their political subdivisions as a substantive aspect of the due process of law
which the states are required to extend to all persons within
their jurisdiction. '^)
The majority opinion in this case made no reference whatever to Point III, The State and County Should Be Held Liable
In This Case Under the Doctrine of "Inverse Condemnation", in
Plaintiffs1 Brief.

[Plaintiffs1 Brief Pg. 34-39].

The Supreme Court did not have the opportunity to evaluate
the dissenting opinion, which was filed 32 days after the majority
opinion was filed.

This fact alone constitutes a substantial

(3)

Barron v. Mayor and City Council 32 U.S. (7 Peter)
243 (1883).

(4)

Griggs v. Allegheny County 369 U.S. 84, 90, (1962).
Chicago B & Q.R.R. v. Chicago 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
See, also, Van Alstyne, Supra, at P.730;Calif. Water
& Tel. Co. v. Railroad Commission 19 F.Supp. 11, 12
(1937).

-6-
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reason for granting a rehearing.

In the event the learned

dissenting opinion of Judge Bullock has caused the Court to
wonder whether it should at this time give further consideration
to the great weight of authority on this fundimental proposition,
we urge the Court to also reexamine the reasons expressed in
Plaintiffs1 Brief at Pages 37-39.
In harmony with Judge Wade's dissenting opinion in Fairclough vs. Salt Lake County, 10 Utah 2d, 417, 354 P.2d 105
(1960), many states have judically expressed the view, that
private property shall not be taken for public purposes without
just compensation as a matter of constitutional requirement
without effectuating legislation.v(5)'
In a very recent case, the Supreme Court of New Mexico
has ruled that the common law doctrine of sovereign immunity
is no longer a valid defense in tort suits against the State
or its political subdivisions.

New Mexico thus becomes the 12th

state to judically put an end to a state's immunity for tort
liability.

(Hicks v. New Mexico 9/26/75)

The court explains that the original
justification for the doctrine—that the
sovereign can do no wrong—is a 'feudalistic
contention1 that is no longer valid. Moreover,
eliminating the state's immunity will not
result in an intolerable financial burden
since adequate insurance can be secured to
eliminate possible liability.
Placing the
financial burden upon the state, which is

(5)

See footnote 6 to dissenting opinion in case at bar.
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able to distribute the losses throughout the
populace, is more just and equitable than
forcing an injured individual to bear the
entire burden alone. There are no longer
any conditions or circumstances that could
rationally support the doctrine, the court
concludes, and its continued validity has
been the cause of a 'great degree of injustice.1 (Page 2159)
It is interesting to observe that the New Mexico Supreme
Court argument urging placing the financial burden upon the
State as more equitable than forcing an injured individual to
bear the entire burden alone, is the same argument Plaintiffs
have urged in support of the doctrine of inverse condemnation.
(Plaintiffs1 Brief Paragraph IV, Pg. 38).
The Utah Legislature in 1965, recognized the injustice of
sovereign immunity in this field by the passage of the Act
under which this Court affirmed the judgment against the State
in this case, t6' but the limitation on the amount of recovery
is arbitrary and unjust.

The legislature, having waived

sovereign immunity, this Court is not bound by a legislative provision which attempts to illegally amend the Constitutions of Utah
and the United States to allow private property to be taken or
damaged for public use without just compensation above $50,000.00
for all the property that may be damaged on one occasion.

Inter-

pretation of the Constitution is not a legislative matter.

That

function is reserved to the judicial branch.

(6)

This Court has the

7A U.C.A. 63-30)
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solemn responsibility to protect the citizens of this State
and their property as the Courts of most other states have done.
One additional element in this case that should not be overlooked is the fact that the damage to Plaintiffs1 property is not
simply the result of an incident connected with, or flowing from
the public project.

The jury found:

The highway project of the State of Utah
including the storm drain system, was
unreasonably defective or dangerous.
Plaintiffs, should be afforded the right not to be deprived
of their property above the statutory limitation without due
process of law, particularly, when such damage is the result
of the negligence of the sovereign.
If sovereign immunity had not been waived in this State,
the force of judicial consensus on the proposition that the
constitutional provision concerning the taking of private property
for public use is self-executing, now requires a fresh look
under present circumstances. As Judge Bullock so profoundly states,
"the proper inquiry is whether the clear right granted by the
Constitution has been abrogated or denied by the legislation."

Is

stare decisis of this Court so essential and the private property
of individual citizens injured by the neglect of the sovereign
so expendable as to prevent this Court from breathing life into
the clear meaning of the Constitution?

The Plaintiffs in the

case at bar furnish this Court with an opportunity to respond to
the clarion call for justice and equity in a field where Utah
finds itself increasingly lonesome.

Progressive thought bears

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the fruits of sound development.

It would be refreshing if 1975

marked the confluence of the flow of Utah protective justice for
its citizens into the mainstream of constitutional fulfillment.
We conclude with the words of the well-known commercial "eventually, why not now?"
B.

Trial By Jury
Article 1, Section 10 of the Constitution of Utah provides:
In capital cases, the right of trial
by jury shall remain inviolent. In
courts of general jurisdiction, except
in capital cases, a jury shall consist
of eight jurors. In courts of inferior
jurisdiction, a jury shall consist of
four jurors. In criminal cases, the
verdict shall be unanimous. In civil
cases, 3/4ths of the jurors may find
a verdict. A jury of civil cases shall
be waived unless demanded. [Emphasis
added].
In this case, the jury by unanimous verdict found that the

flood of August 17, 1969, injured the property of the Plaintiffs
as a proximate result of an unreasonably created defective or
dangerous condition, created by Salt Lake County in the utilization of its storm drain system [Finding B(l)] and [R.723].
The jury further found that Salt Lake County was negligent in
failing to provide reasonably adequate drainage facilities for
the highway project [Finding I][R.728].
The jury further found, that the Contractor, Gibbons &
Reed Construction Company, was negligent in that it failed to
take reasonable precaution to protect the project during construction and that this negligence, proximately caused damage
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to Plaintiffs

[Finding J ( l ) & K][R.728].

The Trial Court declined to enter judgment against Salt
Lake County and Gibbons & Reed Construction Company.
Upon appeal, the Plaintiffs contended, that since the
special verdict against both Salt Lake County and Gibbons &
Reed Construction Company was supported by substantial evidence,
refusal of the District Court to enter a judgment thereon, in
effect, denied the Plaintiffs of their right to a jury trial
[Plaintiff-Respondents1 Brief 27]. This Court affirmed the
judgment with respect to Salt Lake County and Gibbons & Reed
Construction Company.
Taking or damaging property of another by negligent acts
is so clearly an action at common law as not to require citations.

The statutes (7> and Civil Rules of Procedure<8) of this

State protect the right of jury trial in harmony with the State
Constitution.

Here, a jury made a decision on substantial evidence

as indicated in Plaintiffs1 Brief on Appeal at Pages 20 through
the first half of Page 34.

This Court did not attempt to disguish

its holding in First Security Bank of Utah N.A. v. Ezra C. Lundahl,
Inc., 22 Utah 2d, 433, 454 P.2d, 886, 889 (1969):
But when a party has demanded a trial by
jury he is entitled to have the jury find
the facts, and it is not the trial court's
prerogative to make findings inconsistent
therewith and thereby defeat the effect of
the jury's findings.
(7)

9 U.C.A. 78-21-1.

(8)

Rules 38, 39.
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The Court now states:
We find no statutory duty on the part
of the County to supply drainage
facilities for the State Highway
Project.
After discussing the evidence in a limited manner, the Court
further states:
The County, by giving its permission,
to the State to empty the highway drainage system into the County sewer, would
not create liability on the part of the
County for the acts of the State or its
contractor in failing to provide safeguards to prevent obstruction of the
sewer system, nor was the County responsible for the action of the State in
emptying a large conduit into the County's
smaller conduit. In our review of the
record, we find no foundation for the
assessment of liability upon the County.
Plaintiffs concede that the County had no statutory or
other duty to supply drainage facilities for the.State Highway
Project.

But, when it consented to participate in that project,

it acquired a duty as a party in the project, to refrain from
committing the sewer system to the unreasonable creation of a
defective or dangerous condition.
[R.723-24]

The jury so determined.

The opinion of this Court makes no reference to this

finding but states only the subordinate finding; "Salt Lake
County was negligent in failing to provide reasonable adequate
drainage facilities for the highway project".

Salt Lake County

participated in the creation of a dangerous and defective condition and then failed to provide reasonably adequate drainage
facilities for the highway project, which it had agreed to
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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furnish.

It should not escape the liability for its action which

proximately caused damage to the blameless citizens in the
endangered area.
Plaintiffs1 position appears to have not been fully understood or resolved.

The material fact found by the jury on the

participation of Salt Lake County in the creation of a defective
and dangerous condition was overlooked or misconstrued.

The

judiciary should not deny any litigant the right of trial by
jury in a case appropriate to such a mode of trial.
In dealing with the claim of Plaintiffs against Gibbons &
Reed, this Court simply stated the findings of the jury and
concluded with the statement:
. . . f we find no basis upon which to find
that the contractor was liable to the Plaintiffs.
Cases cited in support of this conclusion, do not reach the
point raised by Plaintiffs.

Those cases all support the

general proposition that a contractor is not liable if he
has merely carried out plans, specifications and directions
given him, at least when plans are not so obviously dangerous
that no reasonable man would follow them.

This was the holding

of the Utah Supreme Court in Leininger v. Stearns - Roger
Manufacturing Company. 17 Utah 2d 37, 41, 404 P.2d 33, 36.
But that same case at Page 41, of the Utah Report, and Page 36
of the Pacific Report stated:
However, each case must be decided on the
basis of its own facts and seldom are two
cases identical.
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In the Leininger case, the employment contracts specified that
the contractor would have no responsibility for the adequacy of
the equipment furnished by the employer and the suit was with
reference to an exhaust fan that had been installed for the
employer according to the directions of the manufacturer.

In

the case at bar, the contractor, by contract with the State, was
responsible for damage "on account of or in consequence of any
neglect, in safeguarding the work".

By the same contract,

Gibbons & Reed Construction Company agreed to be responsible
"for all damage or injury to property of any character, during
the prosecution of the work, resulting from any action, omission,
neglect or misconduct in his manner or method of execution of
the work".
The jury found Gibbons & Reed was negligent in failing to
take reasonable precaution to protect the project during construction, and that such negligence proximately caused damage
to Plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs are not contending that Gibbons & Reed is
responsible for damage to property due to design failure or
failure to follow plans and specifications.

The contractor

was negligent in failing to protect the project during
construction in matters for which it was contractually responsible, and in matters within its own discretion.

The

evidence is overwhelming that the contractor knew of the
flooding danger (Plaintiffs1 Brief Pg.31).

The State did
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not purport to instruct the contractor when to remove the
protective barrier from Wasatch Boulevard or when to line
the barrow pits or when to protect the inlets to the storm
sewer.
& Reed.

These were matters within the discretion of Gibbons
Expert testimony revealed that it would not be good

practice to leave the lead drains, which fed into a closed
drain, unprotected during construction, that a clog-free drain
cover could be used and, "ditchriders" could be used to insure
that the intakes remained unobstructed (Plaintiffs1 Brief
PP.32, 33). The employer hired no ditchrider, but left the
project without such protection during the storm in question.
The order of construction of protective measures
responsibility.

was its

This is substantial evidence to support the

jury's finding of negligence.

The Court has merely cited the

evidence of things done right by the contractor.

The weighing

of the evidence is for the jury when the evidence is substantial.
The case of Marian Municipal Water District v. Penninsula
Paving Company, 94 P.2d 404 (Cal.) expressed the general
rule as above-stated, but held at Page 406:
. . . but where the contractor departs
from the contract, plans, or specifications,
or goes beyond them, or performs the work
specified in an improper, careless, or
negligent manner, which results in injury
to adjacent property, then he is responsible
in damages for the tort he has committed.
[Emphasis added].
In the case we now consider, the contractor specifically contracted to assume all damage resulting from failure to protect
the project during construction.
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Wood v. Foster & Creighton 235 S.W. 2d 1, (Tenn.) states:
It is a well-settled rule in this state
that a contractor constructing a public
improvement for a public authority is not
liable to a private property owner for the
resulting damage where the contractor acts
in accordance with the public authority's
orders and is not itself guilty of negligence
in the manner in which it does the work.
[Page 3].
Southwest Construction Company, Inc., v. Ellis, 342 S.W.
2d 485, 488 (Ark.) quotes other cases but specifically recognizes
that when a contractor is guilty of negligence or willful
tort, he is responsible for his damages.

Here the contractor

was negligent in failing to protect the project during construction
and such negligence resulted in damage to the Plaintiffs. If
the law of this state protects a contractor from liability
for his own negligence, committed in violation of his contract,
simply because he otherwise follows plans and specifications,
the decision of this court should so specify with certainty.
The statement by the Court:
Gibbons & Reed having performed its contract
with the State in accordance with the plans,
specifications, and directions given it by
the State with a reasonable degree of skill,
we find no basis upon which to find that the
contractor was liable to the plaintiffs.
does not satisfy this requirement.

We believe the Court

has failed to consider the particular question presented
by the appeal and has disposed of the liability of Gibbons
& Reed Construction Company upon generalities which are
admitted by Plaintiffs.
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CONCLUSION
The issue of inverse condemnation, as raised by appellants,
was not resolved by the Court. Material facts ascertained and
decided by the jury were overlooked or disregarded, and the
issues raised were not fully understood and resolved.

A

rehearing should be granted.
DATED this 21st day of October, 1975.
Respectfully submitted,
BOYDEN, KENNEDY, ROMNEY & HOWARD
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Jrge J. Romney

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify, that copies of the foregoing Petition for
Rehearing and Supporting Brief were served upon the individuals
named below, by mailing two copies to each of said individuals,
by first class mail, this 21st day of October, 1975.
Merlin R. Lybbert &
David W. Slagel
Seventh Floor - Continental
Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
B. L. Dart, Jr.
Ralph L. Jerman
430 Ten Broadway Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

RECEIVED
LAW LIBRARY
DEC 9

1975

BR.G'.IAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY
J. Reuben Clark Law School

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

